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Current and Future Tariff Advantages of Self-Production of Energy, electricity, energy consumption, electricity tariffs

October 3, 2023

Current and Future Tariff Advantages of Self-Production of Energy

Helder Sousa*


Summary

The tariff advantages of Self-Production of Energy (APE) could increase significantly toward the end of this decade compared to the conditions seen by consumers in the free energy market. This is mainly due to the prospect of Angra 3 entering operation starting in 2029, whose costs are not expected to be passed on to self-producers, and to the increase in fixed revenue related to reserve energy from thermal plants provided for in the Eletrobras capitalization law. The possibility of unfavorable hydrology periods also deserves attention. These are the main findings of the study below, which aims to contribute to the debate on the uncertainties that must be considered in financial analyses of self-production energy projects. The text also presents the segment's main rules, including existing models and the tariff components that can affect its feasibility.


Introduction

The evolution of the Brazilian power sector has been marked by various regulatory, technological, and economic transformations. In this context, Self-Production of Energy (APE) emerged as a strategic solution for economic agents to start producing their own electricity at lower cost and with greater competitiveness. Established by Law No. 9,074/1995 and regulated by Decree No. 2,003/1996, APE allows generating units to connect to the National Interconnected System (SIN), selling any energy surplus on the short-term market or to other consumers.

However, the viability of these projects doesn't depend only on technological factors or the energy sale price: tariff composition plays a crucial role in this equation. Exemption from certain sectoral charges, such as the Energy Development Account (CDE) and the Incentive Program for Alternative Sources of Electric Energy (Proinfa), present in the Distribution System Usage Tariff (TUSD), becomes an enabler for APE.

Beyond that, this equation must also consider charges that free consumers pay as part of the settlement carried out by the Electric Energy Trading Chamber (CCEE): the System Service Charge (ESS), the Reserve Energy Charge (EER), and the future Capacity Reserve Charge in the form of Power (ERCAP).

But despite these advantages, the project's financial analysis also has to watch for uncertainties, such as possible changes in legislation and in future charge scenarios, given the complexity of the legal and regulatory framework that permeates the sector.

The goal of this article is to contribute to this debate, through a simulation of how charges affecting the self-production segment will evolve over the coming years compared to those applied to energy used by free consumers. In the text, we also present the segment's main rules, including existing models and the tariff components that should be considered when analyzing the feasibility of a project of this type.


Self-Production Models

As the energy market evolves, APE gains increasing prominence as a viable, strategic alternative for various sectors of the economy, including consumers connected at medium voltage (between 2.3 kV and 34.4 kV). This evolution has been made possible thanks to the creativity and boldness of market agents in developing business models that, within the law and sector rules, have managed to enable projects once accessible only to energy-intensive consumers with large amounts of capital to invest in generation.

This section briefly presents the three main APE arrangements that have been used in the Brazilian market. It's important to note that each of them carries specific risks and benefits.

  • Traditional – a model in which the consumer takes on 100% of the investment, as well as all the risks involved in the business, such as those of development, construction, and operation and maintenance of the generation asset. This is a model where the investor decides to diversify their main economic activity, and it also requires technical and regulatory knowledge. Projects can be developed either near the load, which happens when generation is close to the consumer unit or in what's called a contiguous area, or remotely. In the latter case, costs related to transporting the energy through the transmission and distribution grids must also be considered.

  • By equivalence – a model in which the consumer partners with a power-generation company, which takes on responsibility for the entire process of developing, building, and operating and maintaining the plant. In addition to the requirement that the consumer already be in the free market, also required under the traditional arrangement, the consumer unit must have a contracted demand of at least 3,000 kW. There's no possibility of combining the loads of different consumer units under the same root CNPJ (corporate taxpayer ID) through joint ownership. From a corporate standpoint, the generation plant must be linked to a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) in which all parties involved are signatories, and the consumer must hold a voting equity stake. Although there are different possible arrangements, in this model it's common for the consumer not to contribute a significant amount of capital. It's also necessary to link the SPE to the consumer unit through a supply contract duly registered with the CCEE.

  • Leasing or rental – a model in which the generating agent rents its assets to a consumer. Since it's a rental, there's no need for investment by the consumer. In this arrangement, the generation project's grant is issued in the consumer's name, and several lease agreements are signed (property, generation equipment, and operation and maintenance).

Each APE modality has distinct characteristics that directly affect both the regulatory and contractual complexity and the project's risk-and-return profile. Choosing the right modality, therefore, should be a well-founded decision, taking into account factors such as location, cost structure, and regulatory and contractual requirements.


Tariff Components to Consider in an APE Feasibility Analysis

Exemption from paying certain sectoral charges is one of the pillars supporting the feasibility of an APE project. But given how much these charges vary between distribution companies, submarkets, and voltage levels, it's crucial for the developer to understand future trends in the tariffs associated with them when assessing project risk, since investments of this nature are usually long-term.


TUSD Charges: CDE, Proinfa, CDE TUSD Accounts, and PIS/COFINS Tax Credits.

These are charges billed to both captive and free consumers. For the first three (CDE, Proinfa, CDE_Accounts_TUSD), there's no time-of-use distinction in the tariff, and it's charged volumetrically, in BRL/MWh. For the last one (PIS/COFINS tax credits), there is a time-of-use distinction for the demand tariff, charged in BRL/kW, but not for the tariff charged in BRL/MWh.

  • CDE: this sectoral charge plays a crucial role funding various public policies, notably the social tariff, the 'More Light for All' and 'More Light for the Amazon' programs, as well as subsidies for coal and incentivized energy sources, among others. In numeric terms, the CDE tariff applied to the TUSD stands, on the national average and across all voltage levels, at around BRL 72/MWh. On the legislative side, it's essential to mention Law No. 13,360/2016, which established a mechanism to equalize CDE tariffs between the S/SE-CO and N/NE submarkets. Although this adjustment process is underway, it's expected to be fully implemented by 2030. From that date on, the only differentiation in how the CDE is allocated should be based on voltage levels. In this context, consumers connected at High Voltage, specifically subgroups A3 and A2, will be subject to a CDE tariff equal to just one-third of that charged to residential consumers, who are connected at Low Voltage. Meanwhile, consumers at Medium Voltage, subgroups A3a, A4, and AS, will face a CDE tariff equivalent to two-thirds of the tariff imposed on Low Voltage consumers.

  • Proinfa: this charge corresponds to a current tariff set at BRL 11.40/MWh. Although Law No. 14,182/2021 established guidelines allowing generators tied to the program to renew their contracts — for example, based on the values set by Article 4 of Decree No. 10,798/2021 — no contract-renewal request had been observed as of September 12, 2023. Therefore, the non-renewal of Proinfa contracts can be considered a factor that makes self-production's feasibility less favorable. If this happens, starting in 2034 all Proinfa contracts will have ended, along with the charge itself.

  • CDE_TUSD_Accounts: this tariff is earmarked to repay loans obtained by distribution companies on two recent occasions. The first corresponds to the so-called Covid Account, financing meant to advance revenue to distribution companies and cushion the tariff impacts expected for 2020. In this context, approximately BRL 15 billion was lent, and distribution companies began amortizing it starting with the 2021 tariff events, with completion expected by 2025. The second relates to the water-shortage crisis experienced in 2021, when about BRL 5 billion was extended in loans. Consumers began amortizing this amount in the 2023 tariff events, and it's scheduled to continue until 2027. Currently, consumers connected to subgroup A4 are subject to an average tariff of BRL 9/MWh related to CDE_TUSD_Accounts. However, depending on the distribution company, this tariff can range from BRL 2 to BRL 43/MWh. It's worth noting that APE projects are exempt from contributing to repaying these loans.

  • PIS/COFINS tax credits: in absolute terms, PIS/COFINS tax credits, whose return to consumers began in 2020, helping reduce tariff adjustments, represent a disadvantage for APE. This is because these credits are calculated based on a percentage of the TUSD. Since APE projects enjoy a comparatively lower TUSD, resulting from exemption from certain charges, they end up receiving a smaller benefit from this credit reversal compared to captive or even free consumers. It's worth noting that the extent of this benefit varies by distribution company. While some have already fully applied the available credits to reduce tariffs, others will still need several years to complete the full reversal of these credits. For a deeper understanding of the subject, we suggest reading the article specifically published by TR Soluções.


CCEE Settlement Charges: ESS, EER, and ERCAP

Beyond the four tariff components mentioned above and present in the TUSD (CDE, Proinfa, CDE_TUSD_Accounts, and PIS/COFINS tax credits), APE avoids paying the charges billed to free consumers as part of CCEE settlement. These are: ESS, EER, and ERCAP.

  • ESS: a charge used to fund services provided by power-sector agents aimed at increasing reliability, optimizing generation, and ensuring the security of electricity supply. It's also responsible for funding ancillary services, such as voltage regulators and synchronous generators, in addition to being the funding source for any energy imports from neighboring countries.

  • EER: a charge intended to fund the fixed revenue of plants that hold contracts under what's known as reserve-energy contracting. These plants are contracted through specific auctions aimed at increasing the security of energy supply within the SIN. The EER is used to cover the costs arising from these reserve-energy contracts and is allocated among all end users of electricity in the SIN. The charge's value varies according to the short-term price (Settlement Price of Differences, PLD) of energy. When the PLD is below the plant's operating cost, the EER rises to ensure the plants' fixed revenue is covered. Conversely, when the PLD is above the plant's operating cost, the EER falls, since the plants' fixed costs have already been settled through energy sales on the short-term market. Beyond ordinary reserve-energy auctions, the Simplified Competitive Procedure (PCS), held in 2021 at the height of the water-shortage crisis, also known as the emergency auction, is also funded by the EER. The same applies to capacity-reserve auctions in the form of energy, corresponding to the 8,000 MW of thermal plants provided for in Law No. 14,182 of 2021. In this regard, it's worth noting that, should the remaining 4,200 average MW yet to be contracted under this rule (already factoring in 70% inflexibility) be in full operation by 2031, reserve-energy fixed revenue should rise from the current BRL 15 billion per year to about BRL 30 billion. In this scenario, with a PLD of BRL 69/MWh, the EER would reach about BRL 45/MWh. This calculation was made without considering any renewal related to reserve-energy auctions whose contracts are currently in force. Beyond that, it's important to analyze the possible scenarios that could change APE's feasibility, both regarding hydrology and the actual contracting of these thermal plants. More information on the topic can be found in the article written by TR Soluções.

  • ERCAP: a charge created to fund the new reserve-energy contracting modality, but in the form of power. It was introduced in 2021 and relates to the supply of electricity to the SIN. In this case, capacity reserve in the form of power must be formalized through Capacity Reserve Power Contracts (CRCAP), in addition to a Capacity Reserve Power Usage Contract (COPCAP) signed with the CCEE. The costs arising from this contracting must be allocated among the SIN's end users. Monthly costs are to be paid through billing of the new charge: ERCAP. It's worth mentioning that the charge, although regulated in 2021 by Decree No. 10,707, will still need to be further regulated by ANEEL in the coming years. Billing is scheduled to begin in July 2026, when the capacity contracted in the first auction is expected to be made available.

In short, the complexity of sectoral charges and their variations represent a crucial part of the risk analysis for any APE project. The exemptions offered are undoubtedly attractive, but it's vital to consider the broader picture and the legislative changes that could affect the profitability and sustainability of these ventures over the long term.


Analysis of APE's Future Benefits

To compare self-producers' tariff conditions with those of free consumers, TR Soluções ran a tariff-projection scenario through 2031 using the Energy Tariff Estimation Service (SETE). Among all the variables in TR Soluções' projection model, the following assumptions in the adopted scenario stand out:

  • the analysis was limited to TUSD Charges (CDE/Proinfa/CDE_TUSD_Accounts/PIS-COFINS tax credits) and to the charges billed to free consumers under CCEE settlement (ESS/EER/ERCAP). None of these have time-of-use differentiation and are billed volumetrically, in BRL/MWh;

  • within the projection horizon, we assumed two periods of unfavorable hydrology, replicating the hydrology observed between July 2017 and December 2018 (in 2025 and in 2029);

  • for macroeconomic variables, such as IPCA, IGP-M, GDP, the Selic rate, and the dollar, we used the projections from the Central Bank's Focus report;

  • regarding Proinfa, we assumed that all small hydro (PCH) contracts would be renewed starting in 2024, and none of the program's other sources;

  • we assumed that, beyond the roughly 700 average MW of energy already contracted in the 1st Capacity Reserve Auction in the form of Energy under Law No. 14,182/2021, the remaining 4,200 average MW would be fully contracted;

  • we assumed the Angra 3 plant entering operation starting July 2029, with its cost added to reserve-energy fixed revenue, although the treatment adopted resembles the Proinfa model, as mentioned above;

  • we assumed Roraima's interconnection to the SIN in September 2025;

  • the tariffs presented relate to subgroup A4 consumers, representing a market-weighted average for subgroup A4 across 30 distribution companies, from all SIN submarkets, which correspond to 95% of the total A4 market among Brazil's 51 concessionaires.

The projection result is shown in Figure 1. The black bar corresponds to the TUSD, the Charges and Losses portion, billed without time-of-use distinction and in BRL/MWh, to which self-producers are subject. The stacked bar was split between the TUSD (Charges and Losses), billed to free consumers on the distribution company's invoice, and the charges billed to those consumers under CCEE settlement.


Figure 1 - Outlook for the evolution of charges applied to self-produced energy and the free market

outlook chart, electricity, electricity tariffs, energy consumption

Source: TR Soluções, SETE system.

It can be said that the difference between the two bars corresponds to APE's advantage in sectoral charges compared to the amounts paid by conventional free consumers.

Between 2023 and 2028, APE's average annual advantage relative to the tariff charged to ACL consumers should be a bit over BRL 100/MWh. On the other hand, between 2029 and 2031, that average annual advantage grows 30% due to the factors presented above.

This increase can be linked to the hydrological crisis assumed for 2029, the start of Angra 3's operation, and the significant increase in fixed revenue related to reserve energy due to the commissioning of thermal plants provided for in the Eletrobras capitalization law.


Final Considerations

Beyond the points covered in this article, other conditions faced by energy self-producers should be factored into project analyses because of their potential impact or regulatory uncertainties.

The first is that Law 13,203/2015 brought an extension of benefits for APE using incentivized-source energy. This legislation, together with Law No. 9,427/2016, introduced the opportunity for APE projects to obtain a discount of no less than 50% on the transmission and distribution system usage tariff, commonly referred to as Fio A and Fio B. This discount applies specifically to power-generation projects from renewable sources, making it a relevant factor when assessing the feasibility of APE initiatives.

It's also important to mention that the tariff is part of the calculation basis for ICMS and PIS/COFINS taxes, so an analysis of APE's benefit cannot ignore the reduction in these tax payments. This wasn't considered in the analysis presented in this article, which was limited to tariffs in the same format as those published by ANEEL in its approval resolutions, which are presented net of taxes and fees.

As for uncertainties that could affect project feasibility, two other elements deserve attention: the first concerns the Angra 3 nuclear plant. If the cost-allocation model for the plant resembles that of Proinfa, as can be interpreted from Law No. 14,182/2021, APE projects will likely have no share in its firm capacity. If the allocation model resembles reserve energy, as considered in this study, APE projects also shouldn't bear responsibility for the costs of energy from the nuclear plant.

The second concerns the revision of Annex C of the Itaipu Treaty. There are a few possible arrangements the government could adopt regarding Itaipu-sourced energy, such as: allocating quotas to all distribution companies, including current non-quota holders located in the N/NE submarkets; removing Itaipu energy from the quota system, with the possibility of repurchase by any Brazilian distribution company, and sale of any surplus on the free market; giving it treatment similar to Proinfa, under which all agents (ACR and ACL) would hold a share of the plant's firm capacity, at a price set by the government; or any other arrangement different from these, which may or may not include APE projects.

Finally, there's a third element with the potential to restrict the criteria currently used for free consumers' eligibility as energy self-production agents and thus enjoy the exemptions they're entitled to. The market in general talks about the existence of a decree that could be published by the government at any moment and that would limit the scope of self-production, thereby ending the model of independent energy production treated as equivalent to self-production. But the risk is low: such a decree has been affectionately nicknamed by the market the "Saci Pererê decree," because everyone's heard of it, but no one's ever seen it.

* Helder Sousa is a partner and Director of Regulation at TR Soluções.